Wage Profiles and Income Inequality among Identical Workers: A Simple Formalization by Kitagawa  Akiomi
Wage Profiles and Income Inequality among
Identical Workers: A Simple Formalization
著者 Kitagawa  Akiomi
journal or
publication title
DSSR Discussion Papers
number 23
page range 1-28
year 2014-03-11
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10097/64999
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Data Science and Service Research 
Discussion Paper  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion Paper No. 23 
Wage Profiles and Income Inequality among   
Identical Workers: A Simple Formalization 
 
Akiomi Kitagawa 
March 11, 2014 
Center for Data Science and Service Research 
Graduate School of Economic and Management 
Tohoku University 
27-1 Kawauchi, Aobaku 
Sendai 980-8576, JAPAN 
 
Wage Proles and Income Inequality among
Identical Workers: A Simple Formalization
Akiomi KITAGAWA
Abstract
This paper explores the implications of the possible bankruptcies of
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ket using a two-period general equilibrium model. The bankruptcy
risk attens the wage prole of each rm, weakening its incentive ef-
fect and thereby making room for the eciency wage to be used as
a supplementary incentive device. This, in turn, straties the labor
market into the primary market, in which job rationing is observed,
and the secondary market, in which job rationing is not observed. A
substantial utility dierential emerges between those who have found
a job in the primary market and those who have not, even though
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1 Introduction
Motivating hired workers is one of the most important tasks assigned to those
in charge of business management. The diculty in accomplishing this task
depends on various factors, but when workers' performance is either directly
or indirectly observable, an employer can motivate workers by paying wages
according to their observed performance. This system is simple and eective,
and thus has been used in many workplaces. The piece rate system applied
to insurance agents and taxi drivers is a well-known example of this practice;
others include the systems of seniority wage and severance pay applied to
salaried workers. As Lazear (1979, 1981) argued, in eect, the latter systems
force workers to deposit part of the wages they earn in the early stages of
their career with the employer, with the condition that it will be refunded
if their performance is satisfactory.
For these systems to work well, some conditions must be satised. First,
workers' performance must be observable by the employer since these sys-
tems make the wage payment dependent on it. Their performance need not
be observable at any moment, but must become observable by the end of
the employment period. Second, the employer must not go bankrupt. When
the employer goes bankrupt with some positive probability, the workers in-
escapably bear the risk of not receiving their wages, which seriously weakens
the motivating eect of these systems. If one of these conditions is not sat-
ised, neither the seniority wage system nor the severance pay system can
eectively motivate workers any longer. In such a situation, the employer is
forced either to implement an additional incentive device or to switch from
these systems to a totally dierent one.
This paper explores the implications of the possible bankruptcies of rms
for their own wage schemes and the structure of the labor market in the
framework of a two-period general equilibrium model. In this model, the
economy consists of \capital good" and \consumption good" sectors. In the
capital good sector, rms produce the capital good from labor services on a
one-to-one basis. They can observe the performance of hired workers without
cost, thus paying a competitive wage only to workers who have delivered the
desired performance. In the consumption good sector, rms produce the
consumption good from the capital good and labor services subject to the
following technological constraints. First, they must input labor services
in the rst period, although the output is obtained in the second period.
Second, they cannot observe the performance of hired workers until the
second period. Third, a substantial percentage of the rms that have hired
workers cannot output the consumption good in the second period; however,
in the rst period, no one knows which rms will become unproductive in
the next period. The third constraint means that with a positive probability,
each rm in the consumption good sector goes bankrupt, and thus, its hired
workers cannot receive their wages. No insurance against this \bankruptcy
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risk" is sold in this economy.
The presence of the bankruptcy risk gives special weight to the second
constraint that the performance of hired workers becomes known with a
one-period lag. When the risk is absent, this constraint does not matter to
rms in the consumption good sector since they can choose to pay the entire
amount of wages in the second period, thereby motivating hired workers. In
contrast, when the risk is present, it poses the following agency problem to
these rms: they are forced to \atten" the wage prole|to pay a portion of
the wages in the rst period|because their workers desire to save it to pro-
tect themselves against the bankruptcy risk. Under the second constraint,
however, this payment gives a moral hazard incentive to the workers. Since
their performance is not observable in the rst period, the wage payment in
that period must be made unconditionally. They may make bad use of it,
working not for their original employer but for a rm in the capital good
sector, thereby receiving wage revenues from both employers. Of course,
such behavior is known to the original employer in the second period, and
thus, the cheating workers cannot receive severance pay, that is, the wage
otherwise paid in the second period. However, if the lifetime utility attained
by this cheating behavior is higher than that by honest behavior, the work-
ers choose to cheat their original employer. To prevent this moral hazard,
the rms must pay a sucient amount of severance pay, thereby keeping
the lifetime utility attained by honest behavior higher than that by cheating
behavior.
Such responses by the rms in the consumption good sector cause a
segmentation of the labor market. The bankruptcy risk induces them to
pay more wages, which makes the lifetime utility of their workers far higher
than that of those working in the capital good sector while reducing the
total employment of the consumption good sector. As a result, jobs in the
consumption good sector are rationed among applicants, and those who fail
to obtain these jobs must then work for rms producing the capital good.
Put another way, the labor market is stratied into the \primary" market,
where job rationing is observed, and the \secondary" market, where job
rationing is not observed. The utility dierential between those who have
found jobs in the consumption good sector and those who have not widens
as bankruptcies become more likely. It is also shown that the dual structure
of the labor market reduces the total employment of the consumption good
sector to an ineciently low level. Given the utility dierential mentioned
above, the hiring decision of a rm in that sector has a substantial eect
on the lifetime utility of the hired worker since, if not hired by this rm,
she has no choice but to work in the capital good sector, accepting a low
level of lifetime utility. However, no rms in the consumption good sector
consider this external eect when making a hiring decision, which renders
their employment size too small to attain a social optimum.
It must be emphasized that the model of this paper bears characteristics
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of both the incentive theory of wage proles developed by such authors
as Lazear (1979, 1981) and the eciency wage theory developed by such
authors as Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984); these have been viewed as opposing
theories on motivating workers in the literature. On the one hand, the
model of this paper yields the result that severance pay is used to motivate
workers, which is a characteristic of the incentive theory of wage proles.
On the other hand, it yields the result that the total wage payment by
a rm in the consumption good sector substantially exceeds the market-
clearing level, which is a characteristic of the eciency wage theory. The
bankruptcy risk unites within the model the characteristics of these two
distinct theories in such a manner that it attens the wage prole, weakening
its incentive eect and thereby making room for the eciency wage to be
used as a supplementary incentive device. Such an eect of the bankruptcy
risk immunizes the present model against the criticism of Carmichael (1985).
He criticizes the eciency wage theory for neglecting the possibility that
workers can buy a job in the primary labor market by paying an \entrance
fee." However, such an oer is never accepted by rms in the present model
since it is equivalent to reducing the wage payment in the rst period, which
seriously weakens the morale of workers.
It should also be noted that the atter wage prole (which, in the model
of this paper, results from an increased bankruptcy risk) is not merely a theo-
retical possibility, but a reality for some economies. For example, Hamaaki,
Hori, Maeda, and Murata (2012) analyze a dataset of the wage structure
in Japan and nd that the age{wage prole has been gradually attening
since the burst of the Japanese economic bubble in the 1990s, especially for
employees in the middle or nal phase of their career. Hori and Iwamoto
(2012) conrm this nding using a dierent dataset.1 Behind their nd-
ings, the mechanism stated above might play a role because there is no
doubt that after experiencing the burst of that bubble, increasingly fewer
Japanese businesspeople can have good future prospects.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. Section 3 considers an optimal wage scheme that solves the agency
problem for rms in the consumption good sector. Section 4 examines the
general equilibrium of this model using analytical and numerical methods.
Section 5 adduces a Pareto-improving policy to establish an allocative inef-
ciency of the general equilibrium. Section 6 concludes.
1Kambourov and Manovskii (2009) and Kong and Ravikumar (2012, 2013) also report
that in the US economy, workers who have recently entered the workforce experience
a slower increase in wages than those who entered it many decades ago, although they
investigate not only the wage proles of those who are guaranteed lifelong employment
but also the earnings proles of those who switch jobs several times during their careers.
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2 The Model
Time is discrete. The economy operates during two periods. At the begin-
ning of the rst period, a continuum of identical two-period-lived workers of
measure one are born. For these workers, the rst and second periods are,
respectively, their young and old ages. They are endowed with one unit of
indivisible labor service in the rst period and want to consume in the second
period. Their lifetime utility depends solely on their old-age consumption,
which is formalized as
U = logC; (1)
where U and C denote, respectively, the ex-post level of lifetime utility and
the amount of old-age consumption. Thus, in the rst period, every worker
hires out the endowed labor service and saves all the received income for her
old age.
In both periods, a single kind of nal good is competitively produced.
The nal good can be consumed in the same period in which it is produced.
If it is carried over to the next period, it can be also used as \physical
capital." Under the assumption that workers consume only in the second
period, all of the nal good produced in the rst period is carried over to the
second period and used as physical capital, whereas all of the good produced
in the second period is consumed within that period. Thus, we call the nal
good produced in the rst period the \capital good," and that produced in
the second period the \consumption good."
There are two technologies available for the production of the nal good.
The rst technology turns labor services into the nal good in the rst period
on a one-to-one basis. It is formulated as
Y S = LS ; (2)
where Y S and LS denote, respectively, the output of the nal good and
the input of labor services. Firms using this technology can monitor the
performance of hired workers without cost, so hired workers receive wages
equal to the marginal product of labor:
wS = 1: (3)
These rms constitute the \capital good sector" of this economy.
The second technology turns capital and labor services into the nal
good in the second period. It is formulated as
Y P = AK
 
LP
1 
; (4)
where Y P denotes the output of the nal good in the second period, A the
total factor productivity, K the input of physical capital, LP the input of
5
labor services, and  a constant satisfying  2 (0; 1). We assume that the
input of labor services must be done in the rst period, while that of physical
capital must be done in the second period, which dierentiates (4) from the
normal type of Cobb{Douglas technology that assumes the simultaneous in-
put of capital and labor services. We make the following assumptions about
rms that use this technology, which constitute the \consumption good sec-
tor" of this economy. First, the input level of physical capital that a rm
can choose is either 0 or 1, which ensures that rms yielding the nal good
in the second period are of the same size. It is also assumed that these rms
can procure physical capital at a price of r in the competitive market that
opens in the second period and that physical capital fully depreciates once
inputted into the production process. Second, rms using this technology
cannot know the performance of hired workers until the second period. This
implies that if a rm and a worker have written a contract in which wage
payments are made in both periods, then the payment in the rst period
must be made unconditionally. Third, a percentage  (2 (0; 1]) of rms using
this technology nd at the beginning of the second period that their total
factor productivities take a unitary value, that is, A = 1, while the others
nd themselves unproductive, that is, A = 0 (although, in the rst period,
no one knows which rms become unproductive in the next period). In the
following, we express the state of a rm that turns out to be unproductive
in the second period as \bankruptcy." The possibility of bankruptcy forces
the workers hired by such rms to bear the risk of not receiving the portion
of their wages that is supposed to be paid in the second period. We call
this the \bankruptcy risk," and we assume that no insurance against the
bankruptcy risk is sold in this economy.2
Next, consider a young worker who has received a certain amount of the
nal good in exchange for the endowed labor service. She can save for her
old age by exercising either of the following two options. The rst option
is to carry the received good over to the next period and then to sell it as
the capital good in the competitive market. The gross rate of return on
this option is r. The second option is to lend it at the gross interest rate
of R to rms in the consumption good sector, which need the nal good for
rst-period wage payments. Although each rm in the consumption good
sector goes bankrupt and defaults on its debts with probability 1   , the
worker can secure the gross rate of return on this option at R by suciently
diversifying among borrowers. As a result of the interest arbitrage behavior,
2Some readers may think that this assumption is not justiable because the bankruptcy
risk is idiosyncratic and thus insurable, at least in theory. However, there are some
conceivable situations in which this assumption can be justied. For example, when
insurance companies cannot at all track the working records of insured workers, they
never provide insurance against the bankruptcy risk since they cannot determine who
should receive insurance money.
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these rates of return are equal in equilibrium:
r = R: (5)
Thus, if this worker is hired by a rm in the capital good sector, then her
lifetime utility is given by
US = log rwS = log r: (6)
If she is hired by a rm in the consumption good sector, then her (expected)
lifetime utility is given by
UP =  log(rwP1 + w
P
2 ) + (1  ) log rwP1 (7)
where wP1 and w
P
2 denote, respectively, the wage paid in the rst period and
that paid in the second period (i.e., severance pay).
When the bankruptcy risk is present, that is,  < 1, both wP1 and w
P
2
take a positive value, which can be explained as follows. In such a case,
workers hired by a rm in the consumption good sector eagerly desire wage
payment in the rst period. Although they are forced to bear the risk of not
receiving severance pay with probability 1 , no insurance against this risk
is provided in this economy. All they can do to protect themselves against
this risk is to save the wage paid in the rst period, thereby securing their
old-age consumption in the case of bankruptcy. Put another way, if a rm
in the consumption good sector decides to make no wage payment in the
rst period, that is, wP1 = 0, then the expected utility of a worker employed
by this rm becomes a negative innity, that is, UP =  1 (See (7)). Since
the lifetime utility of a worker employed in the capital good sector is strictly
higher than a negative innity, that is, US = log r >  1 (See (6)), this rm
nds no job applicant as long as it maintains a zero wage payment in the
rst period. For a rm in the consumption good sector, it is not optimal to
pay the whole amount of wage in the rst period either. As stated above,
the wage payment in the rst period is unconditionally made since the rm
cannot observe the performance of hired workers in that period. Thus, if the
labor contract stipulates that all of the wage must be paid in the rst period,
hired workers have an incentive to work not for their original employer, but
for a rm in the capital good sector, and to thus receive wages from both
employers. To prevent such a moral hazard, some portion of wages must be
paid in the second period. We will explore these points further in the next
section.
3 Optimal Design of the Wage Scheme
As pointed out in the previous section, the wage payment to a worker em-
ployed in the consumption good sector is usually made in installments. This
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section examines how the levels of payment in the rst period, wP1 , and the
second period, wP2 , are determined.
Let us rst consider the problem of moral hazard on the part of hired
workers. As described in the previous section, workers hired by a rm pro-
ducing the consumption good have an incentive to make bad use of the con-
tract stipulation that the wage payment in the rst period must be made
unconditionally. Specically, they work not for their original employer but
for a rm producing the capital good, thereby receiving not only the wage
payment from the original employer, wP1 , but also extra income from the
rm in the capital good sector, wS = 1. Of course, such behavior becomes
known to the original employer in the second period, and thus, severance
pay is not paid to the cheating workers. However, by saving this income,
the cheating workers can attain a lifetime utility equal to
UM = log r(1 + wP1 ): (8)
If this utility dominates that attained by honest behavior, UP , all workers
choose to cheat their original employer. In other words, rms in the con-
sumption good sector must design their wage scheme in such a manner that
UP  UM or, equivalently,
 log(rwP1 + w
P
2 ) + (1  ) log rwP1  log r(1 + wP1 ): (9)
Otherwise, they cannot prevent the moral hazard of their hired workers.
Given the interest rate R and the market price of the capital good r,
rms in the consumption good sector maximize their prot subject to (9)
by optimally choosing the number of workers, LP , the wage paid in the rst
period, wP1 , and severance pay, w
P
2 . This problem can be formulated as
max
LP ; wP1 ; w
P
2
(LP )1    r   (RwP1 + wP2 )LP
s.t.  log(rwP1 + w
P
2 ) + (1  ) log rwP1  log r(1 + wP1 ).
(10)
In solving this problem, we should bear the following two points in mind.
First, the above formulation does not reect the possibility of bankruptcy.
Firms need not consider this possibility because in the case of bankruptcy,
they earn zero prot, being exempted from the repayment of debts because
of limited liability. Second, in the formulation of (10), the input of physical
capital is preset at K = 1. Indeed, it is conceivable that prot takes a
negative value for any possible combination of LP , wP1 , and w
P
2 , and thus,
productive rms may decide to set the input of physical capital at zero.
However, this cannot be an equilibrium phenomenon because it means zero
production of the consumption good.
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The rst-order conditions of (10) are derived as
(1  )(LP )   RwP1   wP2 = 0; (11)
 RLP + 


r
rwP1 + w
P
2
+ (1  ) r
rwP1
  r
r(1 + wP1 )

 0; (12)
 RLP + 


r
rwP1 + w
P
2
+ (1  ) r
rwP1
  r
r(1 + wP1 )

wP1 = 0; (13)
 LP + =(rwP1 + wP2 ) = 0; (14)
where  is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the incentive com-
patibility constraint (9).3 The optimal employment size and optimal wage
scheme are obtained by solving (9), (11){(14) with respect to LP , wP1 , w
P
2 ,
and .
Conditions (9), (11){(14) suggest that the optimal wage scheme varies
depending on whether or not the bankruptcy risk is present. When the
bankruptcy risk is absent, that is,  = 1, conditions (9), (11){(14) are easily
solved as
wP1 = 0; w
P
2 = r; L
P = [(1  )=r]1=; (15)
which imply that the whole amount of the wage is paid in the second period.
This result is not surprising since the wage payment in the rst period is
made as insurance against the bankruptcy risk. In this case, the lifetime
utility of a worker employed in the consumption good sector is derived as
UP = log r, and thus, there is no dierence in lifetime utility between the
workers employed in the capital good sector and those working in the con-
sumption good sector. In contrast, when the bankruptcy risk is present,
that is,  < 1, wP1 never takes a zero value because if w
P
1 = 0, the incen-
tive compatibility constraint (9) does not hold. In this case, the workers
employed in the consumption good sector are better o than those working
in the capital good sector. As implied by (9), their lifetime utilities are
equal to log r(1 + wP1 ), which is strictly higher than U
S = log r. Naturally,
all of the workers desire to be hired by a rm producing the consumption
good, although this desire is fullled for only a limited number of workers.
In practice, jobs in the consumption good sector are rationed among ap-
plicants, and those who fail to obtain these jobs must then work for rms
producing the capital good.4 In other words, the presence of the bankruptcy
3The rst-order condition with respect to wP1 must be given by (12) and (13) because
the optimal choice of wP1 can be a corner solution, that is, zero, in the absence of the
bankruptcy risk. No such possibility arises with LP or wP2 .
4In contrast to the argument by Carmichael (1985), the workers in this economy cannot
buy a job in the consumption good sector by paying an \entrance fee." In this model, the
payment of an entrance fee is equivalent to the reduction of the wage payment in the rst
period, wP1 , which makes it dicult for the incentive compatibility constraint (9) to hold.
Thus, every rm in that sector rejects such an oer.
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risk straties the labor market of this economy into the \primary" market,
where job rationing is observed, and the \secondary" market, where job
rationing is not observed.
4 General Equilibrium
To dene the general equilibrium of this economy, we need to evaluate the
rst-order conditions for the rms in the consumption good sector from an
economy-wide perspective. Let l denote the percentage of workers who are
hired by rms in the consumption good sector. Using this notation, we can
express the capital{labor ratio of the consumption good sector as (1  l)=l.
Since all of the rms in this sector are identical, their capital{labor ratios
coincide with that value:
1=LP = (1  l)=l: (16)
Using (5) and (16), we can rewrite (11){(14) as
(1  )[(1  l)=l]   (r=)wP1   wP2 = 0; (17)
wP2 (1     wP1 )  r(wP1 )2 = 0: (18)
Then, we dene the general equilibrium of this economy as follows.
Denition 1. Given the values of  and , the general equilibrium of this
economy is a combination of wP1 , w
P
2 , l, and r that satises (9), (17), (18),
and
[(1  l)=l] 1   r = 0: (19)
Condition (19) requires that the marginal product of physical capital is
equal to its market value in equilibrium. This equalization is attained by
free entry to the consumption good sector. As long as the marginal product
of physical capital dominates its price, new entry to this sector continues
since it is protable to set up a consumption good-producing rm. Such
continuous entry decreases the level of l, narrowing the dierence between
the marginal product and the price to zero.5
We examine the general equilibrium of this economy by taking the fol-
lowing steps. First, we analyze a case in which the bankruptcy risk is ab-
sent. This case serves as a benchmark in analyzing the cases in which the
bankruptcy risk is present. Then, we move to risky cases in which each rm
in the consumption good sector goes bankrupt with some positive probabil-
ity, focusing on the responses of the equilibrium values of wP1 , w
P
2 , l, and r
to a change in .
5As the consumption good sector contains increasingly more rms, increasingly fewer
workers are hired by that sector. This paradoxical result can be explained by the fact that
an increase in the number of consumption good-producing rms necessitates the increased
production of physical capital, and thus, employment increases in the capital good sector.
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4.1 The Riskless Case
When the bankruptcy risk is absent, that is,  = 1, rms in the consumption
good sector set their wage scheme as wP1 = 0 and w
P
2 = r, as seen in the
previous section. Under this wage scheme, conditions (17) and (19) jointly
produce
[(1  l)=l] 1 = (1  )[(1  l)=l]
or, equivalently,
l = 1  : (20)
By substituting (20) into (19), we obtain
r = wP2 = 
(1  )1 : (21)
In this case, there is no dierence in lifetime utility among workers, that is,
UP = US = log(1  )1 .
4.2 Risky Cases
When the bankruptcy risk is present, that is,  < 1, the general equilibrium
can be obtained through the following procedure. Equations (9) and (18)
produce
(1  )wP1
 
1 + wP1
 1
=
 
1     wP1

= 1; (22)
which uniquely determines the equilibrium value of wP1 .
6 On the other hand,
equations (17) and (19) produce
1  l
l
=

1   
1  

 w
P
1
1     wP1
: (23)
By substituting the equilibrium value of wP1 into (23), we can obtain the
value of l, which, combined with (19), determines the value of r. Finally,
by substituting the equilibrium values of wP1 and r into (18), we can obtain
the value of wP2 .
Proposition 1. Let wP1 (), l(; ), and r(; ) denote the equilibrium values
of wP1 , l, and r, respectively. Then, for 8(; ) 2 (0; 1) (0; 1),
dwP1 =d < 0; @l=@ > 0; @r=@ > 0; (24)
6The uniqueness of the equilibrium value of wP1 is established by the fact that the LHS
of (22) is an increasing function of wP1 2 [0; (1  )=), which takes a zero value at wP1 = 0
and approaches a positive innity as wP1 ! (1  )=.
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Figure 1: The sign of @wP2 =@
with
lim
!0
wP1 () = +1; lim
!1
wP1 () = 0; (25)
lim
!0
l(; ) = 0; lim
!1
l(; ) = 1  ; (26)
lim
!0
r(; ) = 0; lim
!1
r(; ) = (1  )1 : (27)
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition asserts that the equilibrium value of wP1 is decreasing
with  from a positive innity to zero, and that those of l and r are increasing
with  from zero to 1  and (1 )1 , respectively. As  takes a smaller
value or, equivalently, the production of the consumption good becomes
riskier, rms producing that good choose to hire fewer workers and pay
them more in the rst period. A smaller value of  also lowers the price of
the capital good since the employment reduction in the consumption good
sector necessarily leads to the same scale of employment expansion in the
capital good sector, and thus to the increased production of that good.
While the signs of dwP1 =d, @l=@, and @r=@ are determined as in (24),
that of @wP2 =@ may take either a positive or negative value depending on
 and , as illustrated in Figure 1. The line drawn in that gure, on which
@wP2 =@ takes a zero value, divides the unit square of the possible combi-
nations of  and  into two regions: wP2 is decreasing with  in the upper
region and increasing with  in the lower region. This contrast between the
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Figure 2: Contours for wage proles
two regions can be explained by the dierential eects of a given increase in
 on UP and UM . As shown in Proposition 1, such an increase in  lowers
the level of wP1 and raises that of r, thereby changing the values of U
P and
UM in such a manner that their equality cannot be maintained unless the
level of wP2 is changed. Because the level of w
P
2 is set to restore that equality,
it is decreased to reduce the value of UP if the increase in  makes UP larger
than UM , and it is increased if the increase in  makes UP smaller than UM .
The rst type of response is observed in the upper region of Figure 1, and
the second type is observed in the lower region.
Numerical methods also enable us to examine how a wage prole for the
workers employed in the consumption good sector, which is measured by the
dierence between the wages paid in the rst and second periods|that is,
wP2   wP1 |is determined for a given pair of  and . Figure 2 depicts the
contours for the wage proles, each of which consists of combinations of 
and  that produce a given value of wP2   wP1 . Specically, the contour n
consists of combinations of  and  that support wP2   wP1 = n. As shown
in Figure 2, the wage proles for the workers employed in the consumption
good sector are front-loading|that is, wP2   wP1 < 0|when both  and 
are small enough, and they are back-loading|that is, wP2   wP1 > 0|in
other cases. The value of wP2   wP1 is not always increasing with , but
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when  is as large as  > 0:5, a small increase in  leads to an increased
value of wP2   wP1 for any value of . Put another way, if the rms in the
consumption good sector perceive a small reduction in  from such a high
level, they oer a atter wage prole to their job applicants.
Proposition 2. Let UP (; ) and US(; ) denote, respectively, the equilib-
rium values of UP and US. Then, for 8(; ) 2 (0; 1) (0; 1), the following
are true:
@US=@ > max

@UP =@; 0

; UP (; ) > US(; ): (28)
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition asserts that when the bankruptcy risk is present, job
rationing occurs at the entrance of the consumption good sector, and thus,
the workers employed in the consumption good sector are better o than
those working in the capital good sector.
Proposition 2 also implies that the bankruptcy risk dierentially aects
the welfare of the workers employed in the capital good sector and that of
those working in the consumption good sector. Specically, a smaller value
of  invariably worsens the welfare of those working in the capital good
sector while worsening less (or even improving in some cases) the welfare
of those working in the consumption good sector, as illustrated in Figure
3. This result is paradoxical since the bankruptcy risk is more detrimental
to those working in the capital good sector, who seem less subject to its
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inuence, than to those working in the consumption good sector, who seem
more subject to its inuence. This paradox can be explained by the fact
that the risk has two opposing eects on the welfare of those working in the
consumption good sector, but only a negative eect on the welfare of those
working in the capital good sector. When the risk is present, the rms in the
consumption good sector are compelled to pay a portion of the wage in the
rst period. This gives a moral hazard incentive to their employed workers,
which, in turn, induces these rms to oer a sucient amount of severance
pay to prevent it. Undoubtedly, this sequence contributes to improving the
welfare of those working in the consumption good sector, although it reduces
that sector's total employment. This reduction expands employment in the
capital good sector on the same scale, increasing the production of that
good and lowering its market price. The lowered price of the capital good
contributes to the worsening of the welfare of all workers since it implies a
decreased rate of return on their savings. Thus, those working in the capital
good sector are more heavily damaged by the bankruptcy risk than those
working in the consumption good sector.
5 A Pareto-improving Policy
Our nal task is to demonstrate that the general equilibrium of this econ-
omy fails to attain a constrained ecient allocation by adducing a Pareto-
improving policy.
In the previous section, we saw that an increase in the bankruptcy risk
may improve the welfare of those working in the consumption good sector
while invariably worsening the welfare of those working in the capital good
sector. However, on the balance, an increase in the bankruptcy risk nega-
tively aects economic welfare, which is measured by the average value of
lifetime utilities, lUP +(1  l)US . This measure coincides with the expected
value of the lifetime utility each worker estimates before entering the labor
market. For any value of , this measure is increasing with , implying that
the ex-ante economic welfare deteriorates as bankruptcies become more and
more likely.
Proposition 3. Let l(; ), UP (; ), and US(; ) be dened as in Propo-
sitions 1 and 2. Then, for 8(; ) 2 (0; 1) (0; 1), the following is true:
@
@

l(; )UP (; ) + [1  l(; )]US(; )	 > 0: (29)
Proof. See Appendix.
We must note that part of the observed deterioration in economic wel-
fare is unavoidable. This deterioration reects the reduced production of
the consumption good, which is caused by an increase in the bankruptcy
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risk. Note that the aggregate production of the consumption good can be
expressed as (1  l)(l)1 . As is obvious from this expression, a decrease
in  reduces the aggregate output for any given value of l. We call this
the \direct" eect. In addition, it reduces the aggregate output by lowering
the level of l. As is easily veried, the aggregate output is maximized at
l = 1 , although the realized level of l cannot take this value unless  = 1.
As  takes a smaller value, the realized level of l deviates from 1 , which
eectively reduces the aggregate output. We call this the \indirect" eect.
Of these eects, the direct one is obviously unavoidable. Part of the indi-
rect eect is also unavoidable since it arises from the necessity of providing
hired workers with a chance of self-insurance and preventing their moral
hazard. Therefore, the question is whether the realized level of l is too low
to be justied by these necessities. The answer is in the armative because
the following policy can increase the employment of the consumption good
sector, thereby improving economic welfare.
Suppose that the government decides to subsidize rms in the consump-
tion good sector by s per worker. If this subsidy is nanced by the lump-sum
tax on the consumption good-producing rms, then the subsidy rate, s, and
the lump-sum tax rate, t, must satisfy
sLP = t; (30)
where LP denotes the number of workers per rm. Under this policy, the
prot of a rm can be written as
(LP )1    r   (RwP1 + wP2   s)LP   t;
which modies the rst-order condition (11) as
(1  )(LP )   RwP1   wP2 + s = 0 (31)
and leaves the other conditions unchanged. This implies that the pol-
icy is neutral to the equilibrium value of wP1 since it is obtained from
the unchanged conditions (18) and (22). In equilibrium, r = R and
LP = l=(1  l), so (31) can be reduced to
(1  )[(1  l)=l] = (r=)wP1 + wP2   s: (32)
The policy also modies the equilibrium condition (19) as
[(1  l)=l] 1 = r + t: (33)
Using k  (1  l)=l, we can rewrite (30), (32), and (33) as, respectively,
t = s=k; (34)
(1  )k = (r=)wP1 + wP2   s; (35)
k 1 = r + s=k: (36)
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Combined with (18), conditions (35) and (36) produce
(1  )k=s = B=[B   (1  )k]  1; (37)
r = k=(B + k); (38)
where B  (1  )wP1 =(1     wP1 ). We can treat B as a constant since
the equilibrium value of wP1 depends solely on .
When the value of s is suciently close to zero, equation (37) has two
distinct roots, k(s) and k(s)(> k(s)). As is easily veried, these roots
satisfy
0 < k(s) < k(s) < [=(1  )]B; (39)
dk=ds > 0; lim
s!0
k(s) = 0; (40)
dk=ds < 0; lim
s!0
k(s) = [=(1  )]B; (41)
where [=(1 )]B is the capital{labor ratio when s = 0 (See (23)). Which
value of k is chosen in equilibrium depends crucially on the value of t. That
is, if t is set as t = s=k(s), then k(s) is realized. However, if t is set as
t = s=k(s), then k(s) is realized. In what follows, we assume that t is
set as t = s=k(s) because it is preferred by all workers.7
When t = s=k(s), the average value of lifetime utilities can be written
as follows:
lUP + (1  l)US = lUM + (1  l)US
= l log r(1 + wP1 ) + (1  l) log r
= log r + l log(1 + wP1 )
= log

(k(s))
B + k(s)

+
1
k(s) + 1
log(1 + wP1 ):
By dierentiating this with respect to s and then evaluating it at s = 0, we
can obtain
d
ds
[lUP + (1  l)US ]

s=0
=   
(k(s) + 1)2
log(1 + wP1 )
dk
ds
> 0;
which implies that the government can improve economic welfare by slightly
subsidizing rms in the consumption good sector, and thus, the laissez-faire
equilibrium fails to attain a constrained ecient allocation. The above policy
has two conicting eects on the average value of lifetime utilities. On the
one hand, it lowers the capital good price, thereby reducing the values of UP
and US . This contributes to decreasing the average value of lifetime utilities.
7Workers are better o when k(s) is realized than when k(s) is realized. This is
because both UP (= log r(1 + wP1 )) and U
S(= log r) are increasing with r and because
under this policy, r is increasing with k 2 (0; [=(1  )]B) (See (38)).
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On the other hand, it augments employment in the consumption good sector,
thereby enhancing the probability of a worker being hired by that sector.
This contributes to increasing the average value of lifetime utilities. When
the subsidy rate, s, is suciently close to zero, the former negative eect
becomes negligible, while the latter positive eect remains substantial. As
implied by (38), the level of r is maximized at k = [=(1   )]B. Since
k(s) satises (41), a suciently small subsidy hardly changes the level of
r, while it enhances the level of l in the rst order. This is why this policy
can increase the average value of lifetime utilities and thus improve economic
welfare.
By resorting to a numerical method, we can compute the optimal levels
of tax and subsidy and their eects on employment and economic welfare. In
the form of contours, Figures 4 and 5 summarize, respectively, the levels of
tax (i.e., t) and subsidy (i.e., s) that maximize the average value of lifetime
utilities for possible pairs of  and . In Figure 4, contours are drawn in
increments of 0.01; the gure suggests that the optimal tax rate is decreasing
with  unless  takes a suciently small value. When  is suciently small,
the optimal tax rate is not a monotone function of . It is increasing in some
domains of  and decreasing in others. In Figure 5, contours are drawn in
increments of 1 because the optimal subsidy rate can take a broad range of
positive values: it becomes as small as 0.0001 when  = 0:99 and  = 0:01,
and as large as 292.38 when  = 0:01 and  = 0:99. As suggested by these
contours, the optimal subsidy rate is decreasing with  and increasing with
.
The eects of the policy with the optimally chosen tax and subsidy rates
are summarized in Figures 6 and 7, which respectively report the population
of workers who are additionally employed in the consumption good sector
and the increments of the average value of the lifetime utilities attained by
that policy. As shown in these gures, the policy has the biggest eect when
both  and  take a suciently small value. To understand why, we need to
recall Proposition 1|(26) in particular|which has demonstrated that the
potential number of workers to be hired in the consumption good sector,
1   , increases as  takes a smaller value, and that the actual number of
workers hired in that sector, l(; ), decreases as  takes a smaller value.
These imply that when both  and  are suciently small, there is great
room for improvement in the economy since the actual employment in the
consumption good sector is far below that sector's employment capacity, and
the existence of such a large gap makes it possible for strong eects to be
observed in these cases. Conversely, when either  or  is suciently large,
there is very limited room for improvement. When  is suciently large, the
employment capacity of the consumption good sector is very small. When 
is suciently large, the actual employment in the consumption good sector
is extremely close to capacity. In both cases, the policy cannot be very
eective because there is little room for a sizable increase in employment in
18
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Figure 4: Optimal levels of tax (t)
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Figure 5: Optimal levels of subsidy (s)
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Figure 6: Increased employment in the consumption good sector
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Figure 7: Welfare gains from the policy
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the consumption good sector.
The argument presented in this section also reveals what makes the equi-
librium value of l so small under laissez-faire policy. As a result of the posi-
tive spillover eect arising from the dual structure of the labor market, when
there is a utility dierential between those working in the capital good sector
and those working in the consumption good sector, the decision of a rm
in the consumption good sector to hire an additional worker unambiguously
contributes to raising the average value of lifetime utilities. Nevertheless,
no rms in the consumption good sector take into account this marginal
contribution to economy-wide welfare when making their hiring decisions
because it brings zero benets to them. Such a gap between private and
social gains from additional employment renders the total employment of
that sector too small to attain a constrained ecient allocation. The policy
considered here does a good job of lling that gap by subsidizing the rms
in the consumption good sector.
6 Conclusion
This paper demonstrated that the possible bankruptcies of rms can have a
substantial eect on not only their own wage schemes but also on the struc-
ture of the labor market. The bankruptcy risk attens the wage prole of
each rm, weakening its incentive eect, and thereby making room for the
eciency wage to be used as a supplementary incentive device. The use of
the eciency wage, in turn, straties the labor market into the primary mar-
ket, in which job rationing is observed, and the secondary market, in which
job rationing is not observed. As a result, a substantial utility dierential
emerges between those who have found a job in the primary market and
those who have not, although there is no dierence in their innate abilities.
This dierential widens as bankruptcies become more likely. In addition,
the dual structure of the labor market renders the employment size of the
primary market too small to attain a social optimum.
The results of this paper have a wide range of applications. For instance,
they give an explanation for the observed decline in youth employment in
Japan. As reported by Genda (2003), after the bursting of the economic
bubble in the early 1990's, large companies in Japan became reluctant to
expand and hire, resulting in a substantial decline in youth employment.
While Genda identies diminishing chances for youths to acquire skills as
well as severe legal restrictions on dismissal as major causes of their displace-
ment from decent jobs, the results obtained here suggest that an increased
possibility of bankruptcy and informational asymmetry have jointly made
hiring a new worker more costly and have thereby reduced job opportuni-
ties for youths. The results may also explain why large companies, the jobs
of which constitute the primary labor market, choose not to substitute the
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dened contribution system for the dened benet system, but rather pro-
vide them together for their employees. As reported by Papke, Petersen,
and Poterba (1996), most of the American companies that adopted a 401(k)
plan, a dened contribution type of corporate pension in the United States,
also continued to implement their pre-existing dened benet pension plans.
From the viewpoint of the incentive theory of wage proles, it is puzzling that
some companies that seem to have a strong incentive to maintain lifetime em-
ployment provided dened contribution pensions for their employees. Since
this is equivalent to an upfront payment of severance pay, according to this
theory, it negatively aects the morale of tenured workers.8 One possible
explanation is that these companies provided the dened contribution plan
for their employees as insurance against the possible bankruptcy of their de-
ned benet plan while motivating them with high wages. This explanation
is consistent with the observation of size{wage dierential.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Equation (22) can be rewritten as
1
wP1
  
1  
=(1 ) 1
wP1
+ 1

= 1
or
(
 )(
 + 1) = 1; (42)
where 
  1=wP1 and   =(1   ). First and most importantly, we need
to demonstrate that (42) implicitly denes the function 
() : R+ ! R
and that 
() has the following properties:
0 < 
()  < 1; (43)
(
() )0 = 
0()  1 > 0; (44)
lim
!0
(
() ) = lim
!0

() = 0; (45)
lim
!+1
(
() ) = 1: (46)
Let  take a given positive value. Then, the LHS of (42) becomes zero
when 
 = , and  + 2 when 
 =  + 1. Because it is continuously
8A similar situation has also been observed in Japan. In July 2002, Toyota Motor
Corporation, one of Japan's leading manufacturers, decided to implement dened contri-
bution pensions together with dened benet pensions by diverting part of the retirement
benet toward contributions to this system. Toyota's decision is puzzling since it seems
to contradict the corporate policy of maintaining lifetime employment, the importance of
which Toyota's top management has repeatedly emphasized.
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increasing with 
, these facts imply that for any value of , the value of 

is uniquely determined between  and +1, establishing (43). To establish
(44), dierentiate both sides of (42) with respect to . Then, we obtain
log(
 ) + 

0()  1

  +

0()

 + 1
= 0;
which can be reduced to

0() =
  log(
 ) + 
 


  +
1

+1
> 0
or, equivalently,

0()  1 =   log(
 ) 
1

+1


  +
1

+1
=
1
 log(
 + 1)  1
+1


  +
1

+1
; (47)
the second equality of which is obtained from (42). Because (43) implies that
the denominator of the RHS of (47) is positive, the sign of 
0() 1 coincides
with that of the numerator of the RHS of (47). Since that numerator is
increasing with 
, we can say that the sign of 
0()   1 is positive if the
following inequality is true:
1

log(
 + 1)  1

 + 1
 

=
=
1

log( + 1)  1
 + 1
> 0: (48)
To prove (48), dene function f as
f(x) = log(x+ 1)  x
x+ 1
:
This function satises f(x) > 0 for 8x > 0 because f(0) = 0 and because
f 0(x) = x=(x + 1)2 > 0 for 8x > 0. Using function f , we can rewrite the
LHS of (48) as f()=. Since  > 0, this means that (48) is true, thus
establishing (44). Properties (43) and (44) jointly imply that there exist
limit values of 
()  when ! 0 and when ! +1, and that
0  lim
!0
(
() ) < lim
!+1
(
() )  1:
To establish (45), suppose that
lim
!0
(
() ) = lim
!0

() > 0:
Then, when ! 0, (42) is simplied as
1 =

lim
!0
(
() )

| {z }
1

lim
!0

() + 1

= lim
!0

() + 1;
23
which implies that lim!0
() = 0, contradicting our initial hypothesis.
To establish (46), rewrite (42) as

()  = (
() + 1) 1=:
Combined with (43), this equation implies that
( + 2) 1= < 
()  < ( + 1) 1=:
Thus, our desired result will be obtained if we can show that
lim
x!+1(x+ a)
 1=x = 1
or, equivalently,
lim
x!+1 (1=x) log(x+ a) = 0; (49)
where a is a given positive number. Let b be another positive xed number.
Then, for suciently large values of x, the following inequalities must hold:
0    log(x+ a)
x
  1
x

x  b
a+ b
+ log(a+ b)

;
which suggests that
0  lim
x!+1 
log(x+ a)
x
 lim
x!+1 
1
x

x  b
a+ b
+ log(a+ b)

=   1
a+ b
:
This condition requires that (49) be true. Otherwise, the above condition
cannot be true for suciently large values of b.
Now that (43){(46) have been established, we can use them to prove
(24){(27). From the dening equations of 
 and , we can obtain
dwP1
d
=
d
d

1

()

 d
d
=  

0()

2
 1
(1  )2 < 0; (50)
which is the rst condition of (24). In addition, (45) and (46) imply, respec-
tively,
lim
!0
wP1 = lim
!0
(1=
()) = +1
and
lim
!1
wP1 = lim
!+1
(1=
()) = lim
!+1
(1=( + 1)) = 0;
both of which constitute (25). Using  and 
(), we can rewrite (23) as
1  l
l
=

1   
1

()  : (51)
24
Dierentiating both sides of (51) with respect to  yields
  1
l2
 @l
@
=

1   
 
0() + 1
(
() )2 
d
d
or
@l
@
=

1   
l2
(1  )2 

0()  1
(
() )2 > 0;
which is the second condition of (24). In addition, (26) is established by
(45), (46) and (51). Specically, (45) implies that
lim
!0

1   
1

()  = +1;
which, combined with (51), means that lim!0 l(; ) = 0. Likewise, (46)
implies that
lim
!+1

1   
1

()  =

1  ;
which, combined with (51), means that lim!1 l(; ) = 1   . We can
rewrite (19) as
r = (1  )1 

1 + 
(
() )
 1
: (52)
Dierentiating both sides of (52) with respect to  yields
@r=@
r
=  (1  )

1
1 + 
  1

  

0   1

 

d
d
= (1  )

1
(1 + )
+

0   1

 

1
(1  )2 > 0;
(53)
which is the third condition of (24). In addition, (27) is established by (45),
(46) and (52). Specically, (45) implies that
lim
!0
1 + 
(
() ) = +1;
which, combined with (52), means that lim!0 r(; ) = 0. Likewise, (46)
implies that
lim
!+1
1 + 
(
() ) = 1;
which, combined with (52), means that lim!1 r(; ) = (1  )1 .
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Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. To establish this proposition, we need only recall that
US = log r(; )
and that, in equilibrium,
UP   US = UM   US
= log r(; )(1 + wP1 ())  log r(; )
= log(1 + wP1 ()):
The rst condition implies that
@US
@
=
@r=@
r(; )
> 0:
The second condition implies that
@
@
(UP   US) = @U
P
@
  @U
S
@
=
dwP1 =d
1 + wP1 ()
< 0:
These jointly mean that
@US=@ > max

@UP =@; 0

and that the value of UP  US is decreasing with . Moreover, when  = 1,
UP   US = log(1 + wP1 (1)) = log 1 = 0:
Therefore, we can conclude that UP  US > 0 for any value of  2 (0; 1).
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The average value of lifetime utilities can be expressed as
lUP + (1  l)US = US + l(UP   US)
= log r(; ) + l(; ) log(1 + wP1 ()):
Because 0 < l(; ) < 1  , we can obtain the following inequalities:
A(; ) < lUP + (1  l)US < B(; ); (54)
where A and B are dened as
A(; )  log r(; );
B(; )  log r(; ) + (1  ) log(1 + wP1 ()):
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As is easily veried,
@A
@
=
@r=@
r
> 0;
and, using 
 and , both of which are dened in the proof of Proposition
1, we can show that
@B
@
=
@r=@
r
+ (1  )dw
P
1 =d
1 + wP1
=
1  
(1  )2

1
(1 + )
+

0   1

   

0

(1 + 
)

=
1  
(1  )2

1
(1 + )
  1

(1 + 
)
+

0   1

 

1  
 

(1 + 
)

> 0;
the second equality of which is obtained from (50) and (53). Dene q(; )
as q(; )  l(; )=(1 ). By construction, q(; ) is an increasing function
of , with lim!0 q(; ) = 0 and lim!1 q(; ) = 1. It is easy to show that
@q
@
=
@l=@
1   > 0:
Using q(; ), we can rewrite lUP + (1  l)US as
lUP + (1  l)US = [1  q(; )]A(; ) + q(; )B(; ):
By dierentiating it with respect to , we can obtain
@
@

lUP + (1  l)US = (1  q)@A
@
+ q
@B
@
+ (B  A)@q
@
> 0;
which implies that the average value of lifetime utilities is an increasing
function of .
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